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Rules of the Road on Private Land
Margaret Mazza*
O N HER WEEKLY SHOPPING SAFARI, Mrs. Suburbanite packs the
family station wagon with the children, and drives to the
Have-It-All Shopping Center. While trying to park in the ten
acre parking lot, which will accommodate 20,000 automobiles,
Mrs. Suburbanite is involved in an accident with another auto-
mobile. If a lawsuit ensues from this hypothetical situation, the
court must determine the traffic laws or regulations applicable
to private property. Generally the problem is handled by first
ruling whether the property is private or public, and then de-
termining the standard of care imposed or the applicable statutory
law.
Public or Private Property
By statute, a street or highway is generally defined as every
way open to the use of the public as a thoroughfare for vehicular
travel. This is distinguished from a private road, which is under
private ownership and is traveled upon by the owner or by those
having express or implied permission from the owner, but which
is not open to use by other persons.1
In a case involving interpretation of that state's Vehicle and
Traffic Law, a New York court said that it was controlled by the
spirit and not the letter of the law, and that the intent of the
Legislature was to regulate and control the traffic of motor ve-
hicles upon the public highways of the state for the better pro-
tection and safety of the people at large.2
The ultimate test used by most courts in determining whether
a place is a "public highway," so as to render vehicle and traffic
laws applicable, is the right to unrestricted use by the public
except for usual police regulations. " In Zielinski v. Lyford4 the
* Pre-Law studies at Ursuline College and John Carroll Univ.; Third-year
student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
1 I.e., Ohio R. Code § 4511.01 (1953); Ind. St. Ann. 47-1814(b) and 47-
1814(c) (1955); Pa. St. Ann. Tit. 75 §2 (1958).
2 Blindless Headlight Protector, Inc. v. Harnett, 138 Misc. 127, 245 N. Y. S.
346 (1930).
3 Weeks v. Byrnes, 33 N. Y. S. 2d 65 (1942); Sills v. Forbes, 33 Cal. App.
2d 219, 91 P. 246 (1939) where, in finding the road to be private property
the court stressed the fact that the permissive use allowed by the owner
could be revoked at any time; Pettine v. Tuplin, 71 R. I. 374, 46 A. 2d 42
(Continued on next page)
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court ruled that any open road or alley in New York, even if
privately owned, is considered a public highway for the pur-
poses of the statute. However, the only driveway which is deemed
to be a public highway is a public driveway. This does not mean
a driveway which some members of the general public may hap-
pen to use from time to time, because such use is common to
all driveways. To determine that a driveway is public, it must
be one in which the public has some right and over which some
public officers have control.
It is not the amount of travel on a roadway that distinguishes
it as a public instead of private. A private road might well have
the larger traffic. It is the right to travel upon it by all the
world, and not the exercise of the right, which makes it public.
Therefore, a "public use" has been defined as the use which each
individual might, of right, demand on the same general terms,
and for the same general purpose, as might any other individual.5
Suit was brought in a Federal Court in a case involving an
accident which occurred on a privately constructed elevated road-
way leading from a street to a dock and serving plants along it.
The roadway was open to the general public and was used ex-
tensively. Plaintiff, a pedestrian on the roadway, was struck by
an angle iron projecting twelve to sixteen feet beyond the rear
of defendant's truck. Defendant argued that the plaintiff was an
implied licensee in his use of the road, and that therefore the
defendant was only liable for wanton and wilful negligence. The
court held that the plaintiff had a right to go to a warehouse
situated on the dock, by reason of his employment, and the road-
way was at least to that extent a public roadway.6
Various fact situations have been brought before courts,
which have necessitated a ruling whether the property is public
or private. A filling station driveway which was limited to the
use of the customers of the station was held not to be a public
street or highway;7 the use of school ground by trucks on a single
(Continued from preceding page)
(1946) roadway held private property because it was posted as private
-and had never been dedicated and accepted.*
4 175 Misc. 517, 23 N. Y. S. 2d 489 (1940).
5 In re Cox, 140 Misc. 313, 250 N. Y. S. 528 (1931).
6 Pacific Hardware & Steel Co. v. Monical, 205 F. 116 (9th Cir. 1913).
7 Kayser v. Johnson, 217 Minn. 140, 14 N. W. 2d 337 (1944) the owner of a
filling station was not held liable under the Safety Responsibility Act for
the alleged negligence of the driver in striking a pedestrian in the station's
driveway, even if the driver was operating the vehicle with the consent of
the owner of the station.
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occasion, to repair or improve the grounds, did not constitute
public traffic on the grounds; 8 driveways leading to public build-
ings or public institutions were considered public driveways;0
the driveway of a cemetery was held to be private property;' 0 a
public cemetery was ruled a public place in a case involving a
mechanic's lien;" a roadway provided for use of the public with-
in Fair Grounds was held to be governed by the rules for public
highways; 12 a federal works project (W. P. A.) was ruled to be
not governed by the law of the road or the rules applying to a
public highway; 1" travel on a road construction project was held
to be regulated by the statutory requirements for public high-
ways; 1 4 a portion of a dedicated highway withdrawn from the
general use of the public due to a temporary obstruction was
held to be governed by the rules of private property; 15 an auto
sales lot was held to be not a public place;' 6 privately owned and
operated parking lots are generally held to be private property. 17
Traffic Law of Private Property
In general the duty of a vehicle driver on private property
is defined by the common law rules of ordinary negligence, or
the standard of care of an ordinary prudent man under like or
similar circumstances, and is not governed by the statutory rules
8 Smith v. Harger, 84 Cal. App. 2d 361, 191 P. 2d 25 (1948); Gattavara v.
Lundin, 166 Wash. 548, 7 P. 2d 958 (1932); compare Taylor v. Oakland
Scavenger Co., 17 Cal. 2d 594, 110 P. 2d 1044 (1941) jury was instructed
that the Vehicle Code provisions where applicable to traffic on school
grounds in absence of special provisions.
9 See supra n. 4.
10 Williams v. Roche Undertaking Co., 255 Ala. 56, 49 So. 2d 902 (1950).
11 Peterson v. Stolz, 269 S. W. 113 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
12 Canard v. State, 175 Ark. 918, 298 S. W. 24 (1927).
'3 Patterson v. Edgerton Sand & Gravel Co., 227 Wis. 11, 227 N. W. 636
(1938) the court said its decision was based upon the private character of
the premises.
14 Distefano v. Universal Trucking Co., 116 Conn. 246, 164 A. 492 (1933);
the court held that the statute does not limit its application to a vehicle on
a traveled portion of the highway. Although the place was not open to
public travel, it was part of a highway upon which the truck was traveling
and the statute is applicable to its operation upon that portion of the high-
way.
15 Czarnetzky v. Booth, 210 Wis. 536, 246 N. W. 574 (1933); a gondola was
placed upon a portion of a dedicated highway for the purpose of unloading.
16 Guscinski v. Kenzie, 282 Mich. 204, 275 N. W. 820 (1937).
17 Zorzecki v. Hatch, 347 Mich. 138, 79 N. W. 2d 605 (1956); Glazer v. Dun-
lap, 52 Ohio L. Abs. 296, 83 N. E. 2d 669 (1948); Stinson v. Columbus &
Chicago Motor Freight Inc., 69 Ohio L. Abs. 449, 125 N. E. 2d 881 (1952);
Weeks v. Byrnes, supra n. 3.
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of the road.'8 Applying this rule, it was held that the statute
relating to the sounding of the horn imposed no absolute duty
on a motorist to sound his horn in backing onto his private
driveway. 19 Another court ruled that the statute regulating
motor carriers was intended to protect people on the public
highways and did not create a liability for a tort against a com-
mon carrier for an occurrence on private property. 20 It has been
held that the statutory requirements relating to rear view mir-
rors2 1 and brakes22 do not apply to vehicular travel on private
property.
Once it has determined that the property is private, and that
the case is governed by the rules of ordinary negligence, the court
is confronted with the problem of what constitutes a breach of
the duty to exercise ordinary care. Generally this resolves into
a question of fact for the jury.23 Under extreme circumstances a
court may hold a motorist to a higher degree of care than that
required under ordinary circumstances. A court in California
ruled that a truck driver has a clear duty of care towards
pedestrians, and is required to exercise greater caution in a school
yard than under ordinary circumstances. 24 Yet a Massachusetts
18 Altmore v. Hunt, 101 Cal. App. 2d 10, 224 P. 2d 904 (1950); Sills v.
Forbes, supra n. 3; Smith v. Bassett, 159 Kan. 128, 152 P. 2d 794 (1944);
Vaughan v. Lewis, 236 Miss. 792, 112 So. 2d 247 (1959); State v. Root, 132
Ohio St. 229, 6 N. E. 2d 979 (1937); Glazer v. Dunlap, supra n. 17; Joseph
v. Larkworthy, 15 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 561 (1913); Weeks v. Byrnes, supra
n. 3; Alexander v. Barnes Grocery Co., 223 Mo. App. 1, 7 S. W. 2d 370
(1928); Nass v. Harris, 117 N. J. L. 427, 189 A. 626 (1937); Edelson v. Hig-
gins, 43 Cal. App. 2d 759, 111 P. 2d 668 (1941).
19 Nass v. Harris, supra n. 18; Edelson v. Higgins, supra n. 18.
20 Albers v. Great Central Transport Corp., 14 Ohio Supp. 25 (Ohio C. P.
1944).
21 Gootar v. Levin, 109 Cal. App. 703, 293 P. 706 (1930).
22 Alexander v. Barnes Grocery Co., supra n. 18.
23 Budgen v. Brady, Fla., 103 So. 2d 672 (1958), motorist is presumed to
see what is clearly visible; Sills v. Forbes, supra, n. 3, dust obscured road-
way; Giardina v. Garnerville Holding Corp., Inc., and Avery v. Garnerville
Holding Corp., Inc., 265 App. Div. 1004, 38 N. Y. S. 2d 913 (1943), aff'd 291
N. Y. 619, 50 N. E. 2d 1015 (1943), smoke obscured a private road; Nelson
v. Mitten, 218 Iowa 914, 255 N. W. 662 (1934), plaintiff moved from a safety
zone to a dangerous zone behind a truck; Laudner v. Jones, 221 Iowa 863,
266 N. W. 115 (1936), plaintiff was pinned against a wall by a backing
truck which was in neutral gear; Long v. Metcaft, 134 S. W. 2d 485 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1939), plaintiff was pinned against a derrick by a truck which had
defective brakes; Rosa v. American Oil Co., Inc., 129 Conn. 585, 30 A. 2d
385 (1943), workman in an uncompleted gas station was injured by a truck;
Radio Cab Inc. v. Houser, 76 U. S. App. 35, 128 F. 2d 604 (D. C. 1942), plain-
tiff was using a gas station to repair his muffler when defendant, who had
been drinking, ran over his leg in the station's driveway.
24 Taylor v. Oakland Scavenger Co., supra n. 8.
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court, presented with a similar fact situation, held that the driver
was bound to use only ordinary care.2 5
Some courts have used, by the way of reference, the rules
of the road or statutory regulations in order to determine what
standard is required of a motorist on private property. It has
been held that the universal custom of operating vehicles on
the right side of the road has been so well established as custom,
as to have the same effect as if it were law. This has established
a standard of care which is required of all drivers, whether they
are traveling on public or on private roads.26 Although the
statutory requirement of sounding the horn before backing was
held to be not binding per se, the court indirectly used this re-
quirement in finding the defendant liable for injuries sustained by
a child in a school yard.27
A difficult problem is presented when the accident occurs on
private property abutting a public road and when the motor ve-
hicle remains on the public road. In Aldridge v. Hasty2 s it was
held that a driver on a highway owed those standing outside the
bounds of the highway a duty to observe and obey positive man-
dates of state motor vehicle traffic regulations, and that state
motor traffic regulations are not intended merely to protect
users of highways, but are designed to protect life, limb and
property of all persons on or about the highways who may suffer
injury as a proximate result of violations of such regulations. In
School v. Walker29 the court ruled that motorists and truck
operators owe a householder the duty not to knock the house off
its foundation. If either did so by negligently violating traffic
laws, he would be liable to the householder for the resulting
damage, and could not successfully assert that there was no neg-
ligence because he did not owe the householder a duty to obey
the traffic laws. Another court held that the rules of the road
relative to the right of way are particularly designed only for
the protection of users of roadways, and that violation of them
as to persons within that class may be negligence per se. But the
owners of buildings on the land abutting the highway would not
25 Tenny v. Reed, 262 Mass. 335, 159 N. E. 913 (1928).
26 Altmore v. Hunt, supra, n. 18; Sills v. Forbes, supra n. 3; Bean v. Coffee,
169 Ark. 1052, 277 S. W. 522 (1925) held it was a question of fact for the
jury whether the driver of a vehicle on private property could be negligent
in stopping on the left side on an alley.
27 Tenny v. Reed, supra, n. 25.
28 240 N. C. 353, 82 S. E. 2d 331 (1954).
29 187 Va. 619, 47 S. E. 2d 418 (1948).
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be within that class, and a motorist's failure to yield the right of
way could not constitute negligence per se as to such an owner.30
Another problem exists for the courts in deciding if the
statutory law of the road is applicable when part of the vehicle
is on private property and part is on a public road. In Santa
Maria v. Trotto3 ' the front wheels of a truck were on a public
highway when it backed up and knocked down the supports of a
platform, thus injuring the plaintiff. Plaintiff sought to invoke
the statutory law. The court held that the legislative intent was
to regulate the use and the operation of vehicles on public high-
ways, and did not have the purpose of protecting persons who
are not travelers on public ways. In City Ice and Fuel Co. v.
Center3 2 defendant appealed judgment against him by the trial
court. The trial court had charged that the statute requiring the
sounding of the horn before backing was binding in that case.
Defendant objected to this charge, on the ground that the acci-
dent occurred on private property. The court held that the house
where the accident happened was very close to the street, if it
did not actually abut on the street, and as the movement of
backing was performed in the street, therefore the statute was
applicable.
In the line of cases involving collisions within parking lots
(constituting private property), the statutory rules of the road
have been held to be inapplicable. The cases have been decided
by the application of the basic principles of negligence law, al-
though widely recognized rules of customs of the road play a
great part in aiding the court in its decisions. In Zarzecki v.
Hatch3 3 the plaintiff's auto, which was proceeding down the
main lane of an airport parking lot, was struck by defendant's
automobile, which was coming into the main lane from a feeder
lane. The plaintiff testified that she first saw the defendant's
car when it was about seventeen feet from her car, and that the
defendant failed to stop before coming into the main lane. The
court, in upholding a judgment for the plaintiff, ruled that the
statutory rule of the road was inapplicable. In reference to the
facts of the case, the court said that it was not necessary for a
motorist in a main lane to stop at the intersection of each feeder
SO Erickson v. Kongsli, 40 Wash. 2d 79, 240 P. 2d 1209 (1952).
31 297 Mass. 442, 9 N. E. 2d 540 (1937).
32 54 Ohio App. 116, N. E. 2d 580 (1936).
33 Supra, n. 17.
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lane in order to be free from contributory negligence as a matter
of law, and ruled that the negligence of the defendant was the
proximate cause of the accident.
In Glaser v. Dunlap"l the accident occurred in an entirely
private parking lot maintained by the owner for the exclusive
use of its employees. The plaintiff was proceeding along an
"aisle," in first gear, when struck at an intersection in the lot
by the defendant who was proceeding down a passage marked
"highway number one." The defendant's car was being operated
in high gear at a speed of about 20 to 25 miles per hour. The
court, sitting without a jury, and applying the common law of
negligence, held the defendant to be liable because of his failure
to observe a proper lookout and his negligence in driving at an
excessive speed under the road conditions. The court applied
the rules that a motor vehicle operator has no right to assume
that the road is clear, and that he who arrives at an intersection
first is entitled to cross first. The court also said that a normally
prudent person would look to the left and then to the right,
because on a public highway he is required to yield to a vehicle
on the right. The court admitted that cars on "highway number
one," on which the defendant was driving cars, were permitted
to move more freely than on the "aisle" upon which the plaintiff
was moving. In holding the defendant liable and the plaintiff
free of contributory negligence, the court pointed out that the
plaintiff reached the intersection well in advance of the defendant
and at a much slower speed.
In Stinson v. Columbus and Chicago Motor Freight Inc.35
the judgment in favor of the defendant was upheld in an action
arising out of a collision in a driveway of a shopping center park-
ing lot. The court ruled that, under the ordinary principles of
negligence law, the trial court could find either an absence of
negligence on the part of the defendant or contributory neg-
ligence on the part of the plaintiff. The defense of contributory
negligence lost the case for a plaintiff allegedly injured in an
accident which occurred on a patron parking lot of an ice com-
pany.3 6
In Weeks v. Byrnes37 the defendant, in backing out of a
parking space in an A. & P. parking lot, hit plaintiff's parked car.
34 Supra n. 17.
35 Supra n. 17.
36 Nicholas v. Chloupek, 231 Cal. App. 2d 184, 72 P. 2d 561 (1937).
37 Supra, n. 3.
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The New York court found for the plaintiff, holding that the
negligence of the defendant had been established by a fair pre-
ponderance of the evidence, and deciding specifically that the
vehicle and traffic law was not applicable to a private parking lot.
Conclusion
As the number of automobiles increases, and as a main at-
traction to retail merchandising becomes the amount of parking
facilities available to customers, courts will be confronted more
often with traffic accidents on private property. Whether the
common law rules of negligence are used, or whether the statu-
tory regulations are applied initially or indirectly by analogy,
the courts will find it more and more important to settle this
legal problem uniformly and realistically.
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